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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD 0. HARTINSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COI1MISSION OF 
UTAH, IV-M INSURANCE AGENCY, 
INC., and THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 16345 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Donald 0. Martinson filed a claim for compensation 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah alleging that he was 
entitled to workman's compensation benefits as the result 
of injuries received in an accident occurring on November 21, 
1976. Liability for benefits \vas denied by the compensation 
insurance carrier on the basis that the injuries were not 
received while Mr. Hartinson was in the course and scope 
of his employment with W-M Insurance Agency, Inc. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL Co:t-1MISSION· 
Following a formal hearing held on June 9, 1978, 
Administrative Law Judge Keith E. Sohm entered Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order denying Mr. Martinson's 
claim and dismissing his application. Hr. Martinson made a 
-1-
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timely Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission as 
a whole, and on February 8, 1979, the Commission entered an 
Order affirming the ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants respectfully request that the Order 
of the Industrial Commission be affirmed and the claim of 
the plaintiff dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants submit the following statement of facts 
as additions and exceptions to those recited by plaintiff. 
Approximately a week prior to the grand opening of 
the Kimball Art Center in Park City, Utah, Hr. Martinson 
received an invitation from Nr. Robert Hilliams to attend 
that openinz o.;-.ci s:=ay as his guest with himself and his 
1vife at cr.eu condominium in Park City. (R. 23-24, 41-42, 51) 
Mr. and Mrs. Williams were friends of Nr. Nartinson and had 
entertained him previously at their Park City condominium. 
(R. 23, 41-42) Mr. Williams was also an unsalaried member 
of the Board of Directors of the Kimball Art Center. (42) 
On the day of the grand opening, Saturday, November 
20, 1976, l1r. Martinson arrived in Park City at approximately 
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon (R. 21A) and met Mr. Williams 
at the Center. Due to the opening the manager of the Center 
was busy and unable to supply Hr. Martinson with all of the 
information he desired that day (R. 40-41) concerning the 
inventory on hand for the opening exhibi·cion, in which Hr. 
Martinson was interested to verify that all the inventory 
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was adequately insured. 
Mr. Martinson spent Saturday evening dining and 
socializing with Mr. and Mrs. Williams and stayed at their 
condominium that night. He arose late the next mo"rning and 
spent the afternoon discussing the Art Center account and 
other matters of mutual interest with Hr. Williams. l1r. 
Martinson was drinking during these discussions and prior 
to his departure back to Salt Lake at approximately 5:30 o'clock 
that evening. Shortly before leaving he telephoned Mr. 
Donald R. Hurst in Salt Lake to report to him that he was 
increasing the coverage on the Art Center account. 
lfui le driving back to Salt Lake City, Mr. Martins on 
was involved in an automobile accident. At the time of his 
hospitalization, over two hours after the accident, ~rr. 
Martinson was found to have a blood alcohol level of .18 
per cent. (R. 177-78) 
The Administrative Law Judge made the following 
Findings of Fact: 
1. Mr. Martinson was not directed to attend the 
Park City openin8 by his employer; (R. 200) 
2. Mr. Martinson had no ability to appraise art 
objects and the changes in coverage 1vhich were made on the 
Art Center's policy were made solely on the basis of reports 
made by the Art Center and could have been made from his 
office; (R. 200) 
3. The trip made by Mr. Hartinson, when viewed 
in light of the testimony as a whole, was primarily social 
in nature. (R. 201-02) 
- :)-
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It should further be noted that Donald Hurst 
testified that the call he received from Mr. Martinson \vas 
regarded only as courtesy because Mr. Hartinson had 
authority to place the business under binder without making 
any request or giving any notice to Hurst. (R. 63) 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
POINT I - THERE IS AJITLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMHISSION' S ORDER DENYING BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF. 
In reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, 
this Court must take notice of the long established principles 
regarding the proper scope of such review. By statute, this 
Court is vested with jurisdiction to review Commission action 
and to set aside such action, "but only upon the following 
grounds: n:. ':"hat the commission acted without or in excess 
of its powers; (2) That the findings of fact do not support 
the award." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-84 (1953). With regard 
to factual issues raised before the Commission, Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-85 (1953) provides that: 
The findings and conclusions of the commission 
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and 
final and shall not be subject to review; such 
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts 
and the findings and conclusions of the commission. 
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the findings 
of fact made by the Commission are not subject to review 
and action based on those findings cannot be disturbed on revie•.; 
unless they were made in disregard of substantial and 
uncontradicted evidence to the contrary and are totally 
without reasonable basis in the record. See Batchelor v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 86 Utah 261, 42 P.2d 966 (1953); Commission 
of Finance v. Industrial Comm'n. 121 Utah 83, 239 P.2d 
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185 (1952); Vause v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 
P.2d 1006 (1965); Evans v. Industrial Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d 
324, 502 P.2d 118 (1972). The Court has also acknowledged 
that in cases where the evidence is susceptible to different 
conclusions, the Court will not weigh the evidence and draw 
its own conclusions but will abide by those of the Commission 
even if the Court might not have arrived at the same result. 
Board of Education v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 504, 132 
P.2d 381 (1942); Peterson v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 
175, 129 P.2d 563 (1942). 
In Milkovich v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 498, 64 
P.2d 1290 (1937), the Court reiterated what must be reflected 
in the Commission record before it could set aside findings 
of fact entered by the Commission. It was noted that to 
reverse the findings on strength strenght of contrary testimony 
before the Commission, it must appear at least that: 
(a) the evidence is uncontradicted, and (b) there 
is nothing in the record which is intrinsically 
discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony and 
(c) that the uncontradicted evidence is not wholly 
that of interested witnesses or, if the uncontradicted 
evidence is wholly or partly from others than 
interested witnesses, that the record shows no 
bias or prejudice on the part of such other witnesses, 
and (d) the uncontradicted evidence is such as to 
carry a mearsure of conviction to the reasonable 
mind and sustain the burden of proof, and (e) 
precludes any other explanation or hypothesis as 
being more or equally as reasonable, and (f) there 
is nothing in the record which would indicate that 
the presence of the witnesses gave the commission 
such an advantage over the court in aid to its 
conclusions that the conclusions should for that 
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reason not be disturbed. 
64 P.2d at 1292. See also, Norris v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 
Utah 256, 61 P.2d 413 (1936). 
In the case at bar, primarily on the basis of the 
applicant's own testimony, the Administrative Law Judge who 
heard that evidence and had an opportunity to evaluate the 
demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, found that Mr. 
Martinson was not acting within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident. This conclusion 
resulted from the findings that Mr. Martinson vlas invited to 
Park City by a long-time firend and former employer to stay 
at his condominium; that much of what transpired while ~1r. 
Martinson was in Park City was social in nature and not 
realted to his employment (of which the evidence concerning 
alcohol consumption was merely some corroboration); that he 
was not directed to Park City by his employer; and that the 
limited job related activities performed while on the trip 
could have been accomplished without making the journey. 
The evidence in the record supporting these 
findings is substantial. Mr. Martinson testified as to his 
friendship and previous social dealings with Mr. Williams 
(R. 41-42), his social activities on Saturday and Sunday, 
including drinking, (R. 53, 55, 68-69) his inability to 
appraise art objects and need to rely on records of the Art 
Center ( 40-41, 50-51), the fact of his invitation by Mr. 
Williams (R. 51), and the fact that his employer had not 
specifically asked or directed him to attent the grand opening 
-h-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 33) 
Based upon this evidence the Administrative Law 
Judge, after citing Prof. Larson's treatise on the effect of 
dual purpose trips and the tests to be utilized in deterrning 
whether such trips are properly considered as within the course 
and scope of employment, indicated that he found Mr. I1artinson's 
trip not to be within his employment duties and, therefore, 
his accident not compensable. (R. 201-202) 
The rule as expressed by Prof. Larson, and as quoted 
by the hearing officer, is as follows: 
The basic dual-purpose rule, accepted by the 
great majority of jurisdictions, may be summarized 
as follows: when a trip serves both business 
and personal purposes, it is a personal trip if 
the trip would have been made in spite of the 
failure or absence of the business purpose and 
would have been dropped in the event of failure 
of the private purpose, though the business 
errand remained undone; it is a business trip if 
a trip of this kind would have been made in spite 
of the failure or absence of the private purpose, 
because the service to be performed for the 
e~ployer would have caused the journey to be made 
by someone even if it had not coincided with the 
employee's personal journey. 
IA. Larson, Workman's Compensation g 18.12 at 
4-228 (1978). 
The Administrative Law Judge found that "(t)aking 
the testimony as a whole it is obvious that to quite an 
extent the intent of the trip was social." (R. 201) In this 
proceeding, the plaintiff is not atacking the adoption of 
the rule as announced by Prof. Larson, but is arguing that there 
should have been no finding that Hr. Martinson's trip had 
a primarily social purpose. This question of fact was 
resolved by the Commission against the plaintiff and, as 
-7- < 
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demonstrated in the above cited authority, is not open to 
revie>v in these proceedings. In fact, a strong argument couli 
be made that an award of compensation would have to be set 
aside on review. 
In the case of Board Education v. Industrial Comm'n, 
102 Utah 504, 132 P.2d 381 (1942), this Court annulled an 
award made by the Industrial Commission where the evidence 
regarding course and scope of employment was of a similar 
quality >vith that presented here. In that case, an employee 
of the Logan City Board of Education had made application 
for benefits as a result of an automobile accident he suffered 
while returning to Logan from Brigham City. The testimony 
showed that he had gone to Brigham City to deliver a lecture 
on recreation and participate in a basketball game. The 
employee testi:ied that as the recreational director for the 
Board of Education he conducted these types of activities 
frequently, and when he had asked his supervisor about how 
often and when he should do so he was instructed to use his 
o>m judgment . 
On this set of facts the Court set aside his 
award, holding that absent more direct proof that his duties 
required his attendance in Brigham City there was no competent 
evidence upon which to base an award. This result was 
reached despite the Court's acknowledgment that the findings 
of the Commission should be presumed correct and not 
reviewed unless they were clearly without reasonable basis. 
In the present case, where there is no direc'c evidence that 
the plaintiff was requested or expected to attend the 
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Park City affair, other than the plaintiff's own assumption 
that he should, the same result might be mandated even if 
the Commission had made findings favoring the plaintiff's 
application. 
While plaintiff has drawn particular attention 
to those portions of the Administrative Law Judge's opinion 
which concern the effect of Mr. ~illrtinson's intoxication at 
the time of the accident, it should be noted that the first 
reason given for t~e denial of benefits, and one which is a 
sufficient legal basis, was that the whole trip was outside 
of the course and scope of employment regardless of Mr. 
Hartinson's state of intoxication at the time he sustained 
his injuries. The fact of his drinking while in Park City 
is merely some evidence of the trip's social, as opposed to 
business, motivation. This is especially revealing in light 
of Mr. Martinson's own recognition that they had diminished 
abilities as an employee when drinking and that it had been 
previously pointed out to him that it would be best if he 
refrained from drinking while working. (R. 36,56). 
The record as a whole is certainly susceptible to 
the interpretation that Mr. Martinson was invited by a long 
standing acquaintance and friend to meet with him on one of his 
infrequent visits from out of state; that the occasion of 
the opening of the Art Center, while being the focus of the 
meeting, was basically a social affair which occupied the 
resident manager's time and attention to such a degree that 
transaction of any real business was impractical; and that 
the little business done on the trip could have been 
_q_ 
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accomplished in another manner and didn't require Hr. Hartinsor 
attendance on the weekend in question. The plaintiff is 
arguing that these conclusions are wrong, but is failing to 
recognize that if there is evidence to support them that this 
Court cannot set them aside. 
In considering this matter, it would be wise to 
bear in mind the admonition expressed in Evans v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d 324, 502 P.2d 118 (1972): 
This type of case, where an employee is injured 
and no doubt needs help, and where society might, 
if possible, under existing law, furnish help, 
--taxes the emotions of people in the judicial 
department. It suggests an urgence to overrule 
administrative agencies charged with processing 
these claims, so as to provide relief without 
statutory sanction, to which we cannot succumb. 
IJe conclude here that however sincerely someone 
else may differ on evidence that justifies 
che Commission's conclusion, we must affirm. 
28 Utah 2d at 326. 
Given the substantial evidence supporting the 
Commission's findings, defendants would submit that the 
factual conflicts resolved by that body are not properly 
subject to review and the order based on those findings should 
be affirmed. 
POINT II - EVEN ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN IN THE COURSE 
AND SOCPE OF HIS E~~LOYEMNT IJHEN IN PARK CITY, HIS SUBSEQUENT 
CONDUCT CONSTITUTED A MATERIAL DEVIATION FROM EMPLOYMENT, 
PRECLUDING COl1PENSATION. 
Even if it were to be assumed that Mr. Hartinson's 
trip was within his course of employment when it began, it is 
fundamental that an employee can, by voluntarily participatinz 
in activities which unjustifiably increase the hazards 
associated with his employment, forfeit the protections of 
- n-
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workman's comp~nsation. Such conduct by the employee consti-
tutes a deviation from his course of employment. As the New 
York Court of Appeals noted in Pasquel v. Caverly, 4 N.Y. 2d 
28, 148 N.E.2d R99, 901 (1958): 
An accident does not arise 'out of' an employment 
when it has been occasioned by some merely personal 
indulgence or gratification. Departure from the 
course of employment does not always depend entirely 
on whether an employee, in making a business trip, 
was on the route to or from the place where the 
business was to be transacted. It may also consist 
in deviation from the procedure which would normally 
be followed in accomplishing the business errand, 
where the death or disability has been the consequence 
of the deviation. Thus if an employee were sent 
on a mission which would ordinarily be accomplished 
in some simple and safe manner, but nevertheless 
undertook to perform it in some extraordinary and 
hazardous fashion, there is little doubt that 
an accident would not be compensable if it arose 
from the bizarre and dangerous manner of performance 
which the employee had selected. Thus, for instance, 
if an employee were sent on an errand requiring him 
to cross a bridge that could have been done in 
perfect safety, but instead, the employee chose for 
his amusement to cross by walking across a grider of 
some uncompleted nearby bridge from which he fell 
into the river, recovery in Workman's Compensation 
would not be available. Such an accident would 
not have arisen 'out of' the employment, even though, 
at the time, the employee might have been on the 
direct route to or from the place of transaction 
of the employer's business. 
In the case at issue, Mr. Martinson's excessive 
consumption of alcohol was a purely personal activity which 
rendered his subsequent return trip to Salt Lake extraordinarily 
hazardous and which constituted a material deviation from 
his course of employment. The evidence offered at the time 
of hearing demonstrates that Mr. Hartinson's level of blood 
alcohol over three hours after the time of his last drink was 
in excess of twice the legal presumption of intoxication set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (3) (1953), as noted 
by che Administrative Law Judge. 
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In voluntarily incapacitating himself in :~his manner, 
the applicant's actions increased immeasurably the danger 
involved in his trip back to his place of residence, both to 
himself and others, and it would be wholly inconsistent with 
sound public policy for this Court to find his employer 
liable for the all too foreseeable result of such a personal 
decision. 
Prof. Larson, in his treatise on compensation law, 
has noted that "if the incidents of the deviation itself are 
operative in producing the accident, this in itself will 
\veigh heavily on the side on non-compensability, ... " IA. 
Larson, Workman's Compensation Law§ 19.61 at 4-263 (1972). 
Larson goes on to note that 
(i)n the prolific category of deviations involving 
dri~kinG, the fact that drinking usually combined 
with driving, in itself added a notorious hazard 
and has undoubtedly been a factor in some denials 
of compensation, whether specifically mentioned 
or not. 
IA. Larson, supra, at 4-264. For a Utah case dealing with a 
deviation from employment involving socializing and drinking, 
see Morley v. Industrial Commission, 23 Utah 2d 212, !f59 P.2d 
212 (1969). In that case, this Court rejected the applicant's 
contention that his actions had been merely an accommodation 
to a prospective customer and held that his activities, 
though tangetially related to an employment purpose, were 
a clear deviation from his duties and not compensable. See 
also, Pricev. ShorewoodMotors, Inc., 2141-Jis. 64, 251N.W. 
244 (1933). 
The plaintiff has urged that Utah's compensation 
scheme contemplates only one effect to be given to an 
_,?-
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employee's consumption of alco~ol, namely the 15% reduction 
in benefits specified in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-14 (1953). 
Defendants would urge that this statutory penalty is only 
operative when it has been shown that the employee was acting 
within the course and scope of his employment, and that in 
making that threshold decision the fact finder is free to 
utilize all criteria which have been developed for gauging 
"course and scope," including noting types of conduct which 
manifest such extreme deviation from employment duties that 
the nexus between job activity and injury is too attenuated 
to invoke any compensation coverage. 
In the circumstances of the present case, defendants 
submit that it would not be arbitrary and capricious for the 
Commission to rest its denial upon a finding that the plaintiff 
had, through purely personal decisions regarding how he would 
conduct himself, so drastically increased the hazards of his 
travel as to constitute a deviation from employment sufficient 
to remove himself from the protections afforded employees, 
including those of section 35-1-14. 
CONCLUSION 
The basic contention of the plaintiff in this 
proceeding is that the Commission made erroneous factual 
determinations when evaluating the evidence presented to them. 
The authority cited herein demonstrates that this Court should 
not and will not review such decisions by weighing the evidence 
to determine how the Court would have resolved those issues, 
but will presume those findings to be correct if there 
is any reasonable basis upon which they might rest. Defendants 
submit that there is substantial evidence to support the 
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findings and conclusions of the Commission and that they shoutc 
therefore be affirmed. 
DATED this __ day of Hay, 1979. 
BLACK & MOORE 
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this __ day of Hay, 1979, I mailed a copy of 
the foregoing Brief to Kent Shearer, MOCK, SHEARER & CARLING, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 1000 Continental Bank Bldg., Salt Lake 
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